The report noted the following facts:

• For bills issued in fiscal years 2001 – 2018, CBP collected over $20 billion in uncollected AD/CV duties.
• For bills issued over the same period, $4.5 billion in AD/CV duties remained uncollected as of May 2019.
• Only 20 importers accounted for $1.93 billion (or 43.3 percent) of the $4.5 billion in AD/CV duties with the remaining $2.52 billion (or 56.7 percent) in uncollected duties accounted for by 1,118 importers.

CBP has also undertaken variety of measures to address uncollected duties. Perhaps most interesting is CBP’s use of new statistical models to identify key risk factors associated with nonpayment. As noted above, with only 20 importers accounting for more than 43 percent of the value of billed but uncollected duties, identifying high risk importers would appear to be a prudent step.

The report also identified the United States’ retrospective system of duty assessment as one factor contributing to complexities in duty collection faced by both agencies. The retrospective system is widely viewed as a net positive, however, which leads to more accurate duty assessment over time. The report concludes that while the two agencies have undertaken measures to address weaknesses in the process for collecting duties, more can be done.

One significant factor that the report failed to identify is that a significant portion of the uncollected duties are the result of prior loopholes in the so-called “new shipper” provisions of the AD/CVD law. Subsequent amendments to the law, including the bonding requirements, have since largely addressed this issue. Additionally, ongoing litigation between CBP and sureties accounts for much of those uncollected duties. Those sureties were left liable for the uncollected duties under bonds written for the importers who defaulted on their duty liability. The sureties have been largely unsuccessful in their attempts to avoid liability under the bonds they issued, and much of this duty liability will likely be collected once that litigation is completed.

A complete copy of the report may be accessed through the GAO’s website or using the following link: https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/702570.pdf.

The underlying dispute focused on three issues in U.S. antidumping proceedings: (1) the weighted average-to-transaction methodology applied by the U.S. Department of Commerce (the Department) in antidumping cases, including the use of zeroing; (2) the Department’s treatment of certain exporters in non-market economies (NMEs) as an NME-wide entity (the single rate presumption); and (3) the Department’s use of adverse facts available in determining dumping margins. The zeroing methodology has been the subject of numerous disputes at the WTO. While some have argued that the practice violates WTO rules, the U.S. has continued to defend it. Speaking in April, Ambassador Lighthizer stated “[t]he WTO rules do not prohibit ‘zeroing[.]’ The United States never agreed to any such rule in the WTO negotiations, and never would. WTO Appellate Body reports to the contrary are wrong. . .”

This award, which comes in the wake of last month’s $7.5 billion award in the U.S.-E.U. Aircraft dispute, is the third largest in WTO history. The $3.579 billion award is authorized on a per annum basis until the U.S. brings its law into compliance with its WTO obligations. The U.S. and China may also seek to resolve the dispute as part of the negotiations in the ongoing trade war.

In July 2016, Commerce issued AD and CVD orders on CORE from China and an AD order on CORE from Taiwan (along with AD and CVD orders on U.S. imports of CORE from India, Italy, and South Korea). CORE subject to the orders is generally defined as a steel sheet that has been coated or plated with a corrosion‐ or heat‐resistant metal (such as zinc, zinc-iron alloy, aluminum, or zinc-aluminum alloy) to prevent corrosion and thereby extend the service life of products produced from the steel. According to Commerce, shipments of CORE from Costa Rica, Guatemala, Malaysia, South Africa, and the UAE to the United States increased in value by 29,210 percent, 35,944 percent, 151,216 percent, 629 percent, and 5,571 percent, respectively, in the 45 months before and after the 2015 initiation of the AD and CVD investigations on CORE from China and Taiwan. If Commerce preliminarily determines that circumvention of these orders is occurring, Commerce will instruct Customs and Border Protection to suspend liquidation and begin collecting cash deposits on imports of CORE from Costa Rica, Guatemala, Malaysia, South Africa, and the UAE using Chinese-origin substrate, and CORE completed in Malaysia using Taiwanese-origin substrate.

Commerce has previously investigated and found circumvention of the AD and CVD orders on imports of CORE from China and Taiwan. In November 2016, in response to requests from domestic CORE producers, Commerce initiated an anti-circumvention inquiry into whether imports of CORE from Vietnam using hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel substrates from China were circumventing the AD and CVD orders on CORE from China. In May 2018, Commerce reached an affirmative final determination in that anti-circumvention proceeding, applying cash deposit rates of 39-199 percent to imports of CORE from Vietnam unless use of non-Chinese origin substrate is documented. In August 2018, Commerce initiated two additional anti-circumvention inquiries – again, at the domestic industry’s request – into whether imports of Vietnamese CORE using substrate from Taiwan and Korea circumvented the duties on CORE from those two countries. In July 2019, Commerce reached preliminary affirmative circumvention determinations with respect to the orders on CORE from both Taiwan and Korea.

Kelley Drye & Warren LLP represented domestic CORE producer ArcelorMittal USA LLC in the original CORE AD and CVD investigations and in the 2016 and 2018 anti-circumvention proceedings.

CBP’s Trade and Travel Report for Fiscal Year 2018 relates a significant uptick in the agency’s investigative work stemming from EAPA allegations. In particular, CBP received nearly double the allegations in fiscal year 2018 that it received in fiscal year 2017. The agency also issued final determinations in 12 investigations, up from only 1 the year before. Despite the uptick in work, CBP touts having “met every statutory deadline for all EAPA investigations,” even rendering decisions ahead of statutory deadlines in some cases, and proclaims that this process has “proven to be a success{}.” CBP’s bullish outlook should encourage even more stakeholders to come forward with allegations and to participate in the process.

There are, however, a few considerations that potential allegers should consider before filing an allegation. CBP’s regulations define the “date of receipt” of an allegation, as the date “on which CBP provides an acknowledgement of receipt of an allegation.” As a practical matter, by defining the date of receipt as the date that CBP acknowledges receipt, CBP has built in a period of time where it can work with allegers to ensure that the agency understands the allegation and identify any potential holes in the allegation that the agency sees at this early stage.

After notifying the alleger that its allegation has been received, the statutory clock on initiation and imposition of interim measures starts ticking. Although the statutory deadline for initiating an investigation is 15 days from CBP’s receipt of an allegation, CBP does not notify the public of its determination to initiate until CBP determines whether it is appropriate to impose interim measures, or not more than 95 days from the date of receipt.

During this 95-day window, CBP seeks to determine whether there is “a reasonable suspicion” that evasion is occurring. If the record does not support such a determination, CBP provides the alleger with an opportunity to withdraw its allegation so that the allegation will not become a matter of public record. This preserves the alleger’s ability to undertake additional research and/or gather additional information, without alerting the alleged evading parties to the allegation.

If CBP determines “a reasonable suspicion” of evasion does exist, or the alleger does not withdraw its allegation, CBPpublishes a notice on its portal. All of CBP’s notices of action can be found here.

Given this interactive approach, it is likely that CBP has devoted significant resources to ensuring evasion of antidumping and countervailing duties is not occurring. Further, as additional stakeholders become aware of this process, it is likely that EAPA investigations will become more commonplace.

In the memorandum, CBP reminds the public that regulations by the Department of Commerce (“DOC”) require that importers must file a certificate advising whether the importer has entered into an agreement, or otherwise has received reimbursement of AD duties, prior to liquidation of the entry.

Failure to file reimbursement certificates (stating that importer was not reimbursed) may double importer’s antidumping duties upon liquidation. CBP’s memorandum offers specifics on how to file the certificates and includes an example of a blanket reimbursement form.

The memo also outlines procedures for filing in ACE and ACS. Although CBP will accept paper reimbursement certificates, it is encouraging importers to file electronically.

CBP addresses other guidelines for filing reimbursement certificates, including the following: • Required language for reimbursement certificates • Instructions for filing blanket certificates

• Instructions for filing blanket certificates • Information regarding reimbursement certificates submitted in a CBP protest

For further information, please visit www.kelleydrye.com/Our-Practices/International/International-Trade or contact a Kelley Drye attorney.

The Commerce Department will now issue AD orders on cold-drawn mechanical tubing from these six countries. The AD orders will complement the CVD orders already in place on imports from China and India, which were issued back in February.

Senator Peters is hopeful that an increased focus on smaller business will allow regional farmers, such as cherry farmers in Michigan, to obtain long-sought relief from potentially dumped competitive products. Both Senators voiced concern that smaller businesses may not be aware of trade violations, or lack adequate resources to investigate suspected violations, which can be both time-consuming and costly. The President has indicated support for the bill.

The Secretary’s press release presents the agency’s key findings and lists the agency’s various recommended remedies. With respect to steel imports, the Department of Commerce recommends three alternative options to the President:

1. A global tariff of at least 24% on all steel imports from all countries, or
2. A tariff of at least 53% on all steel imports from 12 countries (Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam) with a quota by product on steel imports from all other countries equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the United States, or
3. A quota on all steel products from all countries equal to 63% of each country’s 2017 exports to the United States.

1. A tariff of at least 7.7% on all aluminum exports from all countries, or
2. A tariff of 23.6% on all products from China, Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela and Vietnam. All the other countries would be subject to quotas equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the United States, or
3. A quota on all imports from all countries equal to a maximum of 86.7% of their 2017 exports to the United States.

The Commerce Department’s reports also recommend that a process be set up to allow Secretary Ross to grant requests by U.S. companies to exclude certain products from whatever remedy President Trump ultimately imposes.

The Kelley Drye International Trade team is closely reviewing these reports and monitoring any further developments.

Australian exports of bottled wine to Canada declined by nearly half between 2007 and 2016. Australia Trade Minister Steven Ciobo discussed the request for consultations and Australian wine exports to Canada in a January interview with Australian Broadcasting Corp. In the interview he stated, “we have continued to see an erosion of, for lack of a better term, liberalized market access into Canada . . . we are aggrieved over the domestic (wine) regulations that they have in place. It sends a very clear shot across the bow to Canada.”

This complaint follows a similar request for WTO consultations made by the United States against Canada on September 28, 2017. In that request, the U.S. accused the Canadian province of B.C. of discriminating against U.S. wines by providing an exclusive retail distribution channel for B.C. wines in Canadian grocery stores. This was the second request for consultations by the U.S. regarding the sale of wine in B.C. grocery stores, and followed a nearly identical January 2017 request for which the U.S. did not pursue WTO panel adjudication.

Capella did not participate in U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) 2011-2012 administrative review of aluminum extrusions from China. As a result, its entries were subject to the 374.15% “all others” rate under the countervailing duty order. In connection with other litigation, the 374.15% “all others” rate was reduced to 7.37% in October 2015 based on challenges brought by several other importers of aluminum extrusions.

Capella, however, challenged the countervailing duty margin applied to its entries and filed two complaints at the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) challenging Commerce’s liquidation instructions that incorporated that rate. In its complaints, Capella asserted that Commerce could not lawfully apply the 374.15% rate to Cappella’s entries because the disparity between that rate and the litigated 7.37% rate was too great. The CIT dismissed Capella’s complaints for failure to state a claim. In its decisions, the CIT found that the statute contemplates that the CVD rate Commerce established in its final determination is the rate that applies to pre-Timken notice entries when liquidation is not 1) enjoined by a court decision, or 2) the subject of administrative review. Further, because Capella’s imports were entered before publication of the Timken notice, the company did not request administrative review of its entries, and it did not participate in the rate-lowering litigation – it could not claim the benefit of the lower all-others rate.

In its decision, the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s two decisions dismissing Capella’s complaints. The Federal Circuit found that, based on the facts of the case, the statute and legislative history supported the CIT’s findings. Specifically, like the CIT, the CAFC determined that because Capella did not participate in the litigation challenging the 374.15% all others rate, and because Capella’s pre-Timken notice entries were not enjoined by a court order, its entries were properly liquidated “as entered” at the “all others” rate of 374.15% identified in the final determination

In particular, Canada challenges:

1. the way in which the U.S. Department of Commerce refunds cash deposits after adverse WTO determinations;
2. the United States’ suspension of liquidation of cash deposit requirements when the U.S. Department of Commerce preliminarily determines critical circumstances exist;
3. the U.S. Department of Commerce’s treatment of certain export measures by foreign governments in the agency’s countervailing duty proceedings;
4. the U.S. Department of Commerce’s calculation of benefits involving the provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration in the agency’s countervailing duty proceedings; and
5. the U.S. Department of Commerce’s procedures for collecting evidence in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.

Perhaps most concerning to U.S. industries is Canada’s challenge to the United States’ tiebreaker rule. The U.S. International Trade Commission determines whether a domestic industry on whose behalf an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation has been initiated is injured, threatened with injury, or whether material retardation of the establishment of an industry in the United States has occurred. The Commission, which is typically comprised of six Commissioners, can contain no more than three Commissioners from any one political party. When a Commission vote results in a tie, however, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) provides that the determination shall be deemed affirmative.

The next step in the process is for the United States and Canada to consult on the request, and those engagements will be closely watched by the trade community.

As of January 4, 2018, there are 416 antidumping and countervailing duty orders in place, only four of which involve Canada. A list of the orders currently in place is available on the U.S. International Trade Commission’s website.

Low-priced Chinese steel has long been the target of antidumping and countervailing duty trade actions in numerous countries that have seen their domestic steel industries hammered by surging imports, including the United States, the European Union, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and several of China’s neighboring Asian countries. According to the OECD, global steel capacity reached 2.38 billion metric tons in 2016, with China alone accounting for more than half of that capacity. Another nearly 40 million metric tons of worldwide capacity additions are under way and expected to come online by 2019. An estimated 53 million metric tons of capacity expansions are also in the planning stages over the next few years. The modest improvements in global steel demand in 2017 and 2018 are insufficient to combat the overcapacity crisis. As the Chairman of the OECD Steel Committee stated in September 2017, “Forecasts by external experts suggest that steel demand could reach only 1.87 billion metric tonnes in 2035, which would be 0.49 billion metric tonnes or 20.1% below the latest steelmaking capacity level expected for 2017.”

In the past year or so, a groundswell for collective, international action in response to the glut of Chinese steel has resulted in important statements made at the G-20 (establishing a Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity), the OECD, and the WTO, but with little more than non-binding commitments from China. Ironically, China announced that it was relieving taxes on Chinese steel exporters just days after the United States, the European Union, and Japan issued a statement on global trade crises in the wings of the WTO’s ministerial summit in Buenos Aires. The members agreed to “enhance trilateral cooperation in the WTO and other forums” to address, among other things, “severe excess capacity in key sectors exacerbated by government-financed and supported capacity expansion, {and} unfair competitive conditions caused by large market-distorting subsidies and state owned enterprises.” The mention of “excess capacity in key sectors” did not need to directly mention China or steel to reach the right audience, but will likely continue to fall on deaf ears.

As we have reported here and here, the question of whether the United States would continue to treat China as an non-market economy (“NME”) for purposes of the Department of Commerce’s antidumping duty analysis was recently decided by the Administration. In a 200-page memorandum issued at the end of October, Commerce announced that it would continue to apply alternative dumping methodologies with respect to China given the substantial evidence that China continues to be an NME.

That has not stopped China from initiating dispute settlement proceedings at the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) against the European Union (DS516) and the United States (DS515). In each dispute, China is challenging the WTO member’s applied antidumping duty methodology with respect to imports from China, which China believes are prohibited under a provision of its 2001 Protocol of Accession to the WTO and inconsistent with provisions of the WTO Antidumping Duty Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT 1994”).

In the United States dispute, China requested additional consultations with the United States in early November in light of the October memo announcing the United States’ ongoing treatment of China as an NME.

In the EU dispute, a dispute settlement panel was composed in July 2017, and the parties have been filing legal briefs. The United States, as a third party to the EU proceeding, filed its brief last week that presents the United States first legal analysis of this issue with respect to WTO law.

The United States’ argument rests on the interpretation of the GATT 1994 and WTO Antidumping Duty Agreement as recognizing that NME prices are distorted and unreliable, and, thus, unsuitable for the price comparability determination required in an antidumping price comparison. According to the United States, this basic principle – and the authority to reject and replace NME prices for purposes of antidumping comparisons – predates and is not extinguished by China’s Protocol of Accession. In support of this argument, the United States cites to the WTO accession documents of Poland, Romania, and Hungary (NMEs at the time of their accession in the 1960s and 1970s) that affirmed WTO members’ ability to adopt alternative antidumping methodologies unless market economy conditions prevail.

This briefing and argument phase, prior to the dispute settlement panel’s final report to the parties, will take at least six months, and likely longer. The panel’s findings will be subject to appeal, and, if appealed, the entire dispute process may take 18 months to two years. In addition to the United States, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have joined as third parties in the EU dispute.

The Department’s use of self-initiation authority has been judicious and rare. In an agency-issued press release Secretary Wilbur Ross stated, “{w}e are self-initiating the first trade case in over a quarter century, showing once again that we stand in constant vigilance in support of free, fair, and reciprocal trade.” The Department further noted that it last self-initiated a countervailing duty investigation in 1991 on softwood lumber from Canada, and last self-initiated an antidumping duty investigation in 1985 on semiconductors from Japan.

Use of U.S. AD/CVD laws have increased by 65 percent under the Trump Administration, according to the press release, and appear to be a key instrument of choice to combat unfairly traded exports and protect injured and vulnerable domestic industries. The agency notes, apart from the self-initiated cases, that it has initiated 77 combined AD and CVD cases in response to domestic industry petitions in 2017 – in contrast to 48 combined AD/CVD cases initiated in 2016. In addition to these self-initiated dumping and subsidy cases focusing on aluminum from China, the Commerce Department has also initiated a broader Section 232 investigation to determine whether aluminum imports overall threaten to impair the national security. If the Commerce Department issues an affirmative finding, the President has broad power to impose trade remedies – including tariffs and quotas – to “adjust” the imports so that they will not threaten to impair the national security. The Commerce Department’s Section 232 aluminum determination is due in January 2018.

In terms of next steps for the aluminum sheet AD and CVD cases, International Trade Commission preliminary determinations are due on or before January 16, 2018. If the ITC issues an affirmative preliminarily determination that there is injury or threat of injury, then the Commerce Department investigations will continue with deadlines of February 2018 to issue a preliminary CVD determination, and April 2018 to issues a preliminary AD determination. Affirmative preliminary Commerce determinations would allow Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting cash deposits from all U.S. companies importing the subject aluminum sheet from China. If the investigations proceed without any extensions in the preliminary phase, the Commerce Department’s final determinations would be due in April 2018 and July 2018 for the CVD and AD investigations, respectively.

Commerce was spurred to review its position on China’s NME status, last addressed in 2006, following the December 11, 2016 change in China’s Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). By way of background, the WTO Antidumping Agreement permits WTO member countries to impose duties on dumped imports. Those duties are calculated as either the difference between the imported product’s export price and the comparable home market price, or the difference between the export price and a constructed value based on the product’s cost of production. Sometimes, however, those home market prices or costs of production do not reflect market forces, particularly in NME countries. Accordingly, the WTO Antidumping Agreement allows members to apply alternative dumping methodologies, including, for example, values other than home market prices or costs as comparisons to calculating dumping margins.

When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, a provision in its Protocol of Accession dealt with this very situation, permitting China to be treated as an NME for antidumping purposes. Aspects of that provision expired on December 11, 2016. China claims that as of December 12, 2016, the Protocol requires that China be considered an NME for purposes of the antidumping law. The United States has disagreed with China and maintained that the Protocol simply requires that other countries no longer presume that China was still a nonmarket economy; the issue of China’s NME status needed to be reexamined. While the EU has proposed changes in its rules concerning China, neither the EU nor the U.S. has found China to be a market economy. China has requested dispute settlement consultations with the United States and the EU at the WTO.

In the United States, on April 3, 2017, Commerce announced it was seeking public comment on China’s NME status in the context of its antidumping investigation on aluminum foil from China, the agency’s first antidumping duty investigation since the December 11^th change. Commerce accepted submissions until May 10, 2017, by which time it had received an overwhelming majority of comments from industry associations and coalitions, labor unions, individual companies across a variety of sectors, the legal community, and members of Congress in support of continuing China’s NME status.

In reaching its conclusion, Commerce examined the six factors set forth in the Tariff Act of 1930 for determining whether a country is an NME: (1) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the currency of other countries; (2) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining between labor and management; (3) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign country; (4) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production; (5) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises; and (6) any other appropriate considerations. Commerce determined, based on the information provided by the public, that China continues to be a non-market economy:

At its core, the framework of China’s economy is set by the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which exercise control directly and indirectly over the allocation of resources through instruments such as government ownership and control of key economic actors and government directives. The stated fundamental objective of the government and the CCP is to uphold the “socialist market economy” in which the Chinese government and the CCP direct and channel economic actors to meet the targets of state planning. The Chinese government does not seek economic outcomes that reflect predominantly market forces outside of a larger institutional framework of government and CCP control. In China’s economic framework, state planning through industrial policies conveys instructions regarding sector-specific economic objectives, particularly for those sectors deemed strategic and fundamental. . . .

This ability to affect these market forces is apparent in crucial facets of the economy, from the formation of exchange rates and input prices to the movement of labor, the use of land, the allocation of domestic and foreign investment, and market entry and exit. Because of the significant distortions arising from China’s institutional structure and the control the government and the CCP exercise through that structure, the Department finds that China remains a NME country for purposes of the U.S. antidumping law.

Commerce’s full 200 page memo, supported by extensive outside legal, economic, and financial research can be found here. The agency’s decision has been widely praised by domestic manufacturers seeking strong enforcement of the U.S. trade remedy laws.

The Department previously made a preliminary affirmative determination that Chinese exporters and producers of aluminum foil were receiving countervailable subsidies at rates ranging from 16.56 to 80.97 percent.

As a result of the Department’s affirmative preliminary finding of dumping, the agency will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting cash deposits at the applicable rates with certain adjustments based on the preliminary calculated subsidy rates.

The Department’s final determinations in the on-going countervailing duty and antidumping investigations are scheduled to be announced on February 22, 2018.

As part of its investigation into the alleged dumping of aluminum foil from China, the Department initiated an inquiry into whether China should continue to be treated as a non-market economy (“NME”) for purposes of the U.S. antidumping law. In connection with its preliminary affirmative determination that aluminum foil from China is being sold at unfairly low prices in the United States, the Department of Commerce also announced its decision to continue to treat China as an NME. Because the Department already solicited comments and information from the public concerning this issue, it will not reconsider its decision or solicit additional comments or information.

The petitioner is the Aluminum Enforcement Working Group and is represented by John M. Herrmann, Paul C. Rosenthal, Kathleen W. Cannon, Grace W. Kim and Joshua R. Morey of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.

In its preliminary determination, the Commerce Department found both Viraj and Venus to be uncooperative respondents and assigned the companies a preliminary dumping margin of 30.92 percent. This is the same rate that is currently in effect for Indian producers Mukand and Chandan. As a result of its preliminary finding, Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to suspend liquidation of all entries of stainless steel bar produced and/or exported by either Viraj or the Venus Group and require a cash deposit of 30.92 percent from U.S. importers of such goods effective October 18, 2017.

The changed circumstances review request was filed on September 29, 2016 on behalf of seven U.S. stainless steel bar producers. The antidumping duty order has been in effect since February 21, 1995. Viraj was conditionally revoked from the order in 2004 and the Venus Group was conditionally revoked from the order in 2011 because they were found in three consecutive reviews to have engaged in no dumping (i.e., they received three consecutive zero or de minimis dumping margins). Under U.S. law, any company that has an order conditionally revoked may be reinstated under an existing order if the Commerce Department finds that the company has resumed dumping following revocation. This case is just one of a handful of reinstatement proceedings conducted by the Commerce Department to date and serves as a reminder that unfair trading practices by companies conditionally revoked from an existing order may be properly addressed through a changed circumstances review.

Petitioning companies: The petitioning companies are Carpenter Technology Corporation; Crucible Industries LLC; Electralloy, a Division of G.O. Carlson, Inc.; North American Stainless; Outokumpu Stainless Bar, Inc; Universal Stainless & Alloy Products, Inc.; and Valbruna Slater Stainless, Inc. and are represented by David A. Hartquist, Laurence J. Lasoff, and Grace Kim of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.

Mr. Devaney and Mr. Stayin were nominated to fill the Commissioner positions of Commissioners Kieff and Pinkert, who left the ITC earlier this year. President Trump’s two nominations were made with the ITC operating with only four out of six Commissioners and experiencing a historically high Section 337 caseload.

Mr. Devaney has concentrated his legal practice on advising clients on international trade issues and labor and employment disputes arising in litigation, regulatory, and legislative matters. He has acted as trial counsel in arbitration hearings, represented clients in matters arising under the National Labor Relations Act, and represented employers in defense of discrimination claims and in collective bargaining agreement negotiation and administration. His litigation experience includes representing clients before the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and in state and federal courts. Mr. Devaney is a former Commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission, Board Member of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and General Counsel for the Federal Labor Relations Authority.

Mr. Stayin’s legal practice has focused on international trade policy and trade regulation, but also includes non-profit trade association, federal legislative, and federal regulatory law representation. Throughout his years of practicing international trade law, he has litigated antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, sunset reviews, trademark infringement, 301 unfair trade practices, 201 safeguards, 232 national security, generalized system of preferences, export regulation, trade sanctions, anti-boycott, and U.S. Customs and Border Control enforcement issues. He has represented clients before the International Trade Commission, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Court of International Trade, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, NAFTA dispute panels, and NAFTA and Uruguay Round/WTO negotiations. In addition to practicing trade law, Mr. Stayin served as chief of staff to Senator Robert Taft, Jr. and trade advisor to the Senator for the negation of the Trade Act of 1974.

The exclusion order covers stainless steel products manufactured by or on behalf of Viraj, including semi-finished steel, wire rod, bars, angles, wire, flanges and fasteners. The order also applies to stainless steel produced by Viraj that may be sold by other parties, as well as products produced by Viraj made from stainless steel billets and ingots that are melted, refined, and cast by an unrelated third-party.