The EU-Canada interim appeal arbitration arrangement is grounded in Article 25 of the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), which contains rules for resolving disputes arising under WTO agreements. Article 25 DSU provides for “expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement […] of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both parties.” Under Article 25 DSU, parties agree in advance the procedures to be followed. The EU-Canada interim appeal arbitration arrangement thus provides in disputes between Canada and the EU for either party to appeal WTO panel reports to three arbitrators, which are chosen by the WTO’s Director-General from a pool of available former Appellate Body judges. The arrangement further specifies that the arbitration be governed by the provisions of the DSU and other rules and procedures applicable to WTO Appellate Review, and that a single arbitration panel should be formed to hear appeals filed by other WTO members on the same matter. Finally, the EU-Canada appeal arbitration procedure applies only if, and so long as, the WTO Appellate Body is unable to hear appeals.

The EU and Canada’s preferred course would be to unblock the WTO Appellate Body selection process. Work on WTO reforms to this end is ongoing. Reform leading to the re-establishment of the dispute settlement system remains critical in light of the fact that the U.S. might boycott any Article 25 DSU arbitration procedure. Furthermore, buy-in to the EU-Canada approach by other WTO members is uncertain. By activating the provision in Article 25 DSU, the EU and Canada nevertheless offer a way for WTO members to work around the impasse over WTO Appellate Body nominations. The two countries’ interim appeal arbitration arrangement can serve as template for similar arrangements, including a plurilateral arbitration agreement, should the WTO’s Appellate Body’s seats become vacant later this year.

Though not mentioned by name, China was the widely-interpreted intended target of the message. All three countries are bearing the brunt of flooded steel and aluminum fueled by overcapacity in Chinese markets, and the U.S. and EU are denying China’s demand for market economy treatment based on numerous existing market distortion of the kind described in the joint statement. Many of these practices were also the focus of negotiations under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which the U.S. exited earlier in the year, and which also was aimed at shaping Chinese trade behavior.

The trio agreed to enhance efforts in the WTO and other appropriate forums to eliminate these practices, which they described as “serious concerns for the proper functioning of international trade, the creation of innovative technologies and the sustainable growth of the global economy.” The coordinated statement was an otherwise positive message coming from a Ministerial marked with measured ambitions and low expectations from participating member countries, who also were critical of perceived lack of U.S. leadership at the WTO.