Our preview of the Supreme Court’s consideration of Duguid can be found here and our analysis of the oral argument can be found here. The Court’s decision is discussed below, and its opinion can be found here.

Background

Plaintiff Noah Duguid alleged that defendant Facebook had used an ATDS without the requisite consent to contact him via text message when its systems used an automated response protocol to alert a customer-provided number of an access attempt. Mr. Duguid alleged that he did not have a Facebook account and never provided consent for Facebook to send him text messages. In 2018, the Northern District of California dismissed Duguid’s TCPA claim against Facebook because it held that he had failed to properly allege the use of an ATDS where the complaint’s allegations “strongly suggested direct targeting rather than random or sequential dialing.” In 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision. It reasoned that Duguid had sufficiently pled the use of an ATDS by alleging Facebook’s equipment “had the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.” The Ninth Circuit thus held that any device or system that could store telephone numbers was an ATDS restricted by the TCPA. Facebook appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

The TCPA defines an ATDS as equipment that has the capacity “(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” The Supreme Court took up the following question: “Whether the definition of ATDS in the TCPA encompasses any device that can ‘store’ and ‘automatically dial’” telephone numbers, even if the device does not ‘us[e] a random or sequential generator?’”

Although the Supreme Court’s Duguid decision stemmed out of a challenge to the Ninth Circuit’s ATDS definition, five other federal circuit courts of appeals had weighed in on that issue, creating a deep circuit split. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had held that any predictive dialer or system that dials from a stored list should be considered an ATDS under the TCPA. On the other hand, the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits held that an ATDS must have the capacity to generate random or sequential telephone numbers to be subject to the restrictions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).

SCOTUS’s Decision: Supreme Court Reverses the Ninth Circuit

In an opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, a unanimous Supreme Court held that to qualify as an ATDS subject to Section 227(b)’s restrictions, a device or system must use a random or sequential number generator in storing or in producing a telephone number. The Court found that because “the equipment in question must use a random or sequential number generator” to be an ATDS, “[t]his definition excludes equipment like Facebook’s login notification system, which does not use such technology.”

The Court started by confirming that a proper reading of the statutory text confirmed the narrower standard. The Court reasoned that under clear rules of grammar, the modifying phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies both antecedent verbs: “store” and “produce.” Additionally, the Court reasoned that because the modifying phrase immediately follows the cohesive clause “store or produce telephone numbers to be called” it would be odd to apply the modifier to one part of the cohesive clause. Thus, the Supreme Court cut through the grammatical roadblock that had led some circuit courts into opining that equipment that could simply “store” telephone numbers could be considered to be a restricted ATDS.

Justice Sotomayor’s opinion also relied on the statutory context of the TCPA to support the Court’s holding. The Court noted that the TCPA’s ATDS restrictions “target a unique type of telemarketing equipment that risks dialing emergency lines randomly or tying up all the sequentially numbered lines at a single entity.” Congress intended to address a very nuanced problem; therefore, expanding the definition of an ATDS to encompass any equipment that merely stores telephone numbers would go beyond the intent of Congress, and “take a chainsaw to these nuanced problems when Congress meant to use a scalpel.” Additionally, the Court noted that such an expansive definition would encompass virtually all modern cellphones and expose ordinary cell phone owners to TCPA liability when they engage in speed dialing or send automated text message responses, which could not have been Congress’s intent.

As to public policy concerns, the Court refused to impose “broad privacy-protection goals” onto the statute’s narrow definition of ATDS, noting: “[t]hat Congress was broadly concerned about intrusive telemarketing practices, however, does not mean it adopted a broad autodialer definition.” The Court noted that the TCPA would continue to restrict artificial and prerecorded voice calls, regardless of the narrow reading of ATDS, and that fears of a “torrent” of “robocalls” are thus overstated. In the end, as Judge Sotomayor explained, “Duguid’s quarrel is with Congress, which did not define an autodialer as malleably as he would have liked.”

In a short concurrence, Justice Alito agreed with the Court’s ruling, but wrote separately to take issue with the main opinion’s reliance on a “set” grammar rule. He advised that the canons of statutory interpretation are meant to be used as tools to help identify the way in which “a reasonable reader” would have understood the text of a statute at the time it was issued. The other justices dealt with Justice Alito’s concurrence in a footnote, and reminded lower courts to be methodical when interpreting statutory text.

Impact

There are hundreds of litigations and arbitrations pending around the country dealing with claims of illegal use of an ATDS, and dozens of high-profile class action cases have been stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Duguid. The Court’s decision will alter the course of current and future cases as courts and litigants now have a uniform definition of an ATDS when assessing ATDS-based claims brought under Section 227(b) of the TCPA. Additionally, Duguid has provided guidance for companies that wish to directly reach out to current and prospective customers, by settling the question of what types of devices and systems will be considered an ATDS so as to require specific prior consents for their use. The decision has already prompted calls for a legislative response to the Court’s more narrow interpretation of ATDS from lawmakers who want to “amend the [TCPA], fix the Court’s error, and protect consumers.”

The Court’s decision also moots much of the ATDS question remanded to the FCC in 2018 in ACA International v. FCC. Given that the Court has now interpreted the ATDS definition, the FCC will not be required to provide its own interpretation of the term. In addition, the Court undermines alternative formulations of the ATDS definition occasionally advanced by the FCC that inquire as to the ability to initiate a high volume of calls or texts in a short period of time. The Court’s statement that it does not “interpret the TCPA as requiring such a difficult line-drawing exercise around how much automation is enough” likely moots that line of inquiry. Finally, several pending petitions ask the FCC to create or modify exceptions to the ATDS restriction. Many of those petitions will have less practical impact going forward.

Prerecorded/artificial voice call claims and Do Not Call violation claims under the TCPA, however, were not the focus of the Court’s decision. Callers should remain vigilant about their communications practices and ensure that they have procedures in place to remain fully compliant with the TCPA.

If you have any questions, please contact our experienced TCPA team.

Question Presented

The Supreme Court granted review of the question: “Whether the definition of ATDS in the TCPA encompasses any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “us[e] a random or sequential generator”?”

Six Circuits have previously answered the question. The Second, Sixth and Ninth held that a predictive dialer or system that dials from a stored list can qualify as an ATDS under the TCPA. The Third, Seventh, and Eleventh require that technology must have the capacity to generate random or sequential telephone numbers to qualify as an ATDS. The Seventh Circuit decision, Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., was penned by then-Judge Barrett, who participated in today’s argument. In addition, the D.C. Circuit’s 2018 remand in ACA International v. FCC questioned whether a broad reading of ATDS was lawful.

This case arises out of the Ninth Circuit’s broad approach to the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system under the TCPA.

Procedural History

The controversy comes before the Supreme Court on the basis of text messages that plaintiff Duguid allegedly received from Facebook in 2005. Duguid alleged that Facebook had violated the TCPA by maintaining a database of numbers on its computer and transmitting text message alerts to selected numbers from its database using an automated protocol. Facebook filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Duguid had failed to plead the use of an ATDS. The district court held that the ATDS allegations were insufficient because they “strongly suggested direct targeting rather than random or sequential dialing” and dismissed the case. Soon after, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, holding that an ATDS definition includes devices with the capacity to store numbers and to dial numbers automatically. Duguid appealed the prior dismissal of his claims and, applying Marks, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Facebook asked the Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

Briefing

Duguid, Facebook, and the United States have fully briefed the issue. Duguid argues for a broad definition of ATDS based on the statutory text and two canons of construction, the distributive-phrasing canon and last-antecedent canon, that he alleges show the adverbial phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies the verb “to produce” but not the verb “to store.” Facebook, on the other hand, posits that the statutory language “using a random or sequential number generator” is an adverbial phrase that modifies both the verbs “store” and “produce.” Under that approach, the statutory text limits the definition of an ATDS to technology that uses a random- or sequential-number-generator. The United States filed a brief agreeing with Facebook that the plain text of the TCPA limits the definition of an ATDS to random- or sequential-number-generators. The government’s grammatical analysis focuses on the comma that precedes the adverbial phrase, pointing to past Supreme Court decisions and canons of statutory interpretation that advise such a comma is evidence that the phrase is meant to modify all antecedents (in this case, both the verbs “store” and “produce”).

Oral Argument

Argument in the case went over the scheduled hour by about 20 minutes. Facebook and the United States split the first 30 minutes and Duguid took the remaining time, excluding Facebook’s brief rebuttal. While oral argument does not always foretell the Court’s decision, certain trends developed.

• Grammatical Construction: A majority of Justices seemed to agree that Facebook and the United States had a stronger grammatical reading of the statute, but struggled with both the awkwardness of the construction, and the surplusage problem that their interpretation creates.
  • Justice Alito, for example, asked both Facebook and the United States whether it made sense to talk about random or sequential number generators as a device that can “store” numbers, wondering if their interpretation rendered the verb “store” superfluous. In response, the United States suggested that Congress was likely taking a “belt-and-suspenders” approach to drafting.
  • The Chief Justice, noting that most speakers do not resort to statutory canons of interpretation to understand language, suggested that the “sense” of the provision was more important than its syntax.
  • Justice Kavanaugh repeatedly asked about the different scope of the prohibition on artificial or prerecorded voice calls and “live” calls using an ATDS, as a way to understand the ATDS language.
  • Justice Gorsuch asked Facebook and the United States to address an alternate interpretation, offered by then-Judge Barrett in her decision in Gadelhak, that the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” could modify the phrase “telephone numbers to be called” instead of the verbs “store” and/or “produce.” Both parties asserted this interpretation would lead to their preferred outcome.
• Broader Questions on TCPA Scope: The Justices also pressed the parties on questions unrelated to the grammatical construction the statute.
  • Justice Thomas asked why “text messages” were covered by the TCPA at all, given that the statute’s language only regulates calls and later called the statute an “ill fit” for current technology. Justice Thomas’s question is indicative of a broader concern, shared expressly by Justices Sotomayor, Alito and Kavanaugh, that the TCPA may be ill-suited to regulate technology that looks very different from the technology available in 1991 when the TCPA was passed.
  • Justices Sotomayor, Barrett, Breyer, and Gorsuch each questioned whether the Ninth Circuit’s broad definition of an ATDS would expose all smartphone users to potential liability.
  • Justice Barrett was concerned specifically with the call-forwarding function and seemingly “automated” functions that modern cellphones are equipped with.
  • Duguid seemed unable to provide the Justices with a satisfactory answer on several of the non-grammatical issues and gave conflicting answers concerning the role for, and level of, human interaction necessary to remove technology from the definition of an ATDS.

The Court is expected to issue its ruling by Spring 2021. To learn more about the background of the case, the Circuit Courts’ varying definitions of an ATDS, and the potential implications for the Court’s ruling, consider listening to Kelley Drye litigator and Partner Paul Rosenthal’s preview podcast of Duguid or Kelley Drye’s monthly TCPA Tracker.

Click here to listen to this episode.

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Case Background

Allan came before the Sixth Circuit on appeal of the district court’s entry of summary judgment for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant had placed 353 calls to them using an ATDS after they had each revoked consent. The district court held that defendant’s system qualified as an autodialer. It was undisputed that the system did not randomly or sequentially generate numbers. It would place calls to a daily-created list based on a stored list of a numbers in connection with collection of specific individual’s private education loan debt. By a 2-1 majority, the Sixth Circuit concluded that equipment may be an ATDS if it has the capacity to store numbers to be called, or to produce numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers.

Majority Opinion

The majority opinion found that the ATDS definition is facially ambiguous. The TCPA defines an ATDS as “equipment which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator” (and the capacity to dial those numbers automatically). The opinion engaged in a grammatical analysis of the statutory text to resolve the definition’s latent ambiguity, which interpretation it then confirmed with reference to relevant statutory and administrative history.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that a predictive dialer or system that dials from a stored list could qualify as an ATDS under the TCPA. The Court relied on the existence of exceptions to help establish the rule. For example, the Court confirmed that the “prior express consent” exception permits calls made using an autodialer if the recipient has given his or her prior express consent to receiving those calls. Thus, it reasoned, “[a]n exception for consented-to calls implies that the autodialer ban otherwise could be interpreted to prohibit consented-to calls. And consented-to calls by their nature are calls made to known persons, i.e., persons whose numbers are stored on a list and were not randomly generated.” Ergo, the Court held that the definition of an ATDS must broadly sweep in stored-number systems and predictive dialers, not just calls to unknown individuals via random or sequential number generation.

Delving into the TCPA’s legislative history, the Court highlighted Congress’s intent to crack down on pervasive and intrusive telemarketing practices. Rather than regulate certain types of technology used to place calls, the TCPA was meant to curb the calls themselves – particularly the near-daily, multiple calls that formed the Allan plaintiffs’ cause of action.

Consistent with every other Circuit to have addressed the issue, the Sixth Circuit reached this decision without administrative guidance, holding that prior guidance from the FCC, including those pre-2015, was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit in its 2018 decision ACA International v. FCC. While some District Courts have relied on those prior FCC orders, the Circuit Courts, with the exception of the Second Circuit, have held that the prior orders were set aside.

Importantly, the Court affirmatively declined to comment on the potential impact of human intervention on dialing because, it found, the defendant failed to present a legal basis for that argument in this case.

Dissent

The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion and methodology, putting forth a third interpretation of the statutory language. Rather than modifying the verbs “store” and/or “produce,” the dissent maintained that the language “using a random of sequential number generator” should be read to modify the entire phrase “telephone numbers to be called.” In the instant case, because the telephone numbers dialed were not generated randomly or sequentially, the dissent would have held that the equipment at issue did not qualify as an ATDS.

The dissent gave four reasons why its interpretation was the “best” reading among the three possible interpretations. First, it does not require a judicial rewrite of the statute as does the definition of an ATDS that includes stored-number systems: even if unartfully drafted, it is grammatically correct. In contrast, the majority’s definition requires a grammatically incorrect reading of the statute. Second, it avoids the problem of superfluity associated with a definition of ATDS that excludes stored-number systems (thereby rendering the term “store” in the statute’s definition surplusage). Third, the dissent concludes that the interpretation is consistent with the FCC’s early orders interpreting the TCPA. The FCC’s early definitions of an ATDS define it “as a device that uses a random or sequential number generator.” And fourth, the dissent argues that Congress’s intent was in fact to curb the use of machines that dialed randomly or sequentially generated numbers, pointing out language from an early congressional hearing to that effect. (KDW note: This argument is similar to the argument made by then-Commissioner Ajit Pai in dissent to the 2015 FCC decision that was overturned in ACA International v. FCC.)

What Comes Next

The Sixth Circuit’s position only further deepens the divide between the Circuits with six, evenly split Circuits having offered their positions. In the short term, the Allan decision expands the definition of an ATDS for callers and litigants in the Sixth Circuit; thus, increasing the potential risks and exposure.

The Allan decision is not likely to have lasting effect, however, because the United States Supreme Court has accepted a case to address the ATDS definition. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Allan closely tracks the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duguid v. Facebook, 926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019). That decision has been accepted for review by the Supreme Court and will be argued in the fall. The resolution of the appeal should settle the question of what is an ATDS, providing (we hope) consumers and businesses alike with clear guidance on permissible autodialing systems.

Interestingly, the defendant in Allan had opposed a motion to stay the pending appeal until the Supreme Court reached a decision in Facebook. With this unhelpful ruling in hand, the defendant in Allen may file its own petition for certiorari, and/or seek further review by the Sixth Circuit en banc.

[1] These circuits stand opposite to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, which hold that an ATDS must use a random or sequential number generator. Although the Third Circuit has also weighed in Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2018), the Allan court took the position that it did not expressly construe the definition. “The Third Circuit has not expressly addressed this question, but it did assume (without providing any analysis) that an ATDS must use a random or sequential number generator.” Allan at 5, n.3; but see Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 F. App’x 369 (3d Cir. 2015) (considering “the definition of ‘random or sequential’ number generation” and confirming “the phrase refers to the numbers themselves rather than the manner in which they are dialed.”)

The TCPA prohibits telemarketing calls to be placed using an ATDS without the requisite level of prior consent. Thus, the definition of what technology qualifies as an ATDS is often a fundamental, threshold question upon which TCPA litigation turns. Prior to 2015, the FCC had offered various, sometimes vague, interpretations of the term. In 2015, the FCC offered an expansive definition, which was set aside in March 2018 in the ACA International decision. While the issue has been before the FCC on remand for over two years now, courts nevertheless engaged in their own analysis of the statute, resulting in a broadening Circuit split on how the law is interpreted and applied and divergent outcomes based on the court in which the case is filed. Now the Supreme Court is poised (potentially) to resolve that dispute.

DEFINITION OF AN ATDS

Since the March 2018 decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in ACA International set aside the FCC’s overbroad and expansive definition of an ATDS, two distinct interpretations of an ATDS have emerged. In Marks v. Crunch San Diego, the Ninth Circuit held that any equipment that dials telephone numbers from a stored list qualifies as an ATDS under the TCPA. That expansive approach threatens to encompass ordinary smartphones on the market within the TCPA’s ambit. This approach is also employed by the Second Circuit. In contrast, the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have opted for a narrower, more textually honest and logical interpretation, that requires a showing that equipment has the present capacity to generate numbers using randomly or sequentially and dial them. (Arguably, the D.C. Circuit’s decision also called for an interpretation closer to the Third, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit interpretations). District Courts in the remaining Circuits (as well as some where the Circuit Courts have spoken) have generally (but inconsistently) adhered to one of these two approaches. Some of our prior discussions of these issues can be found here and here.

FACEBOOK SEEKS AN END TO TCPA CONFUSION

In Facebook, Inc. v. Noah Duguid, et al, Case No. 19-511 (2020), plaintiff Noah Duguid alleges that defendant Facebook had contacted him via text messages without appropriate levels of consent using an ATDS, as that term is defined under the TCPA. Mr. Duguid is not a Facebook customer and alleges that he received repeated login notification text messages from Facebook. Plaintiff alleges that he never provided the company with his cellphone number, much less prior express written consent to be contacted by text. Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed in the Northern District of California in March 2015 and dismissed without prejudice for failure to properly allege that an ATDS was used to send the texts at issue. In his Amended Complaint, Duguid added factual allegations that Facebook used an ATDS by maintaining a database of numbers on its computer and transmitting text message alerts to selected numbers from its database using an automated protocol.

Facebook again moved to dismiss Duguid’s allegations arguing that the TCPA was unconstitutional and that Duguid failed to plead the use of an ATDS. On February 16, 2017, the District Court granted Facebook’s motion to dismiss, finding the ATDS allegations were insufficient. Because of that finding, the court never reached the constitutional question. The court reasoned that Duguid’s ATDS allegations “strongly suggested direct targeting rather than random or sequential dialing,” which did not indicate the use of an ATDS. Importantly, the District Court rendered its opinion before the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the ATDS definition in Marks v. Crunch San Diego in September 2018.

On June 13, 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal. Applying the Marks standard, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Duguid had sufficiently alleged that Facebook used an ATDS by alleging the equipment “had the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.” The Ninth Circuit separately addressed Facebook’s constitutional challenge to the TCPA and agreed that, although the TCPA included content- and speaker-based restrictions on speech, the overall statute could be salvaged by severing what it saw as the most offensive aspect—the government debt exception.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

Facebook appealed and in its petition to the Supreme Court presented both the constitutional challenge and definitional question for review.

On July 6, 2020, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the TCPA in William P. Barr et al. v. American Association of Political Consultants et al., Case No. 19-631 (2020), thus mooting the constitutional challenge in Facebook’s petition. Our analysis of that decision can be found here.

On July 9, 2020, three days after it released its decision in Barr, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question: Whether the definition of ATDS in the TCPA encompasses any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “us[e] a random or sequential generator”?

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s resolution of this circuit split has the potential to forever change business communications by making it more or less difficult for businesses to reach their customers. As noted, a threshold question in TCPA litigation is whether equipment used to originate a call or text is an ATDS. The D.C. Circuit, in remanding the FCC’s 2015 expansive definition, noted that definition’s “eye-popping sweep.” Just how far the 29-year-old TCPA’s definition should reach into modern dialing technology has been a central question in litigation since the D.C. Circuit remand. How the Supreme Court addresses this could affect the methods businesses use to provide notifications and reminders to customers as well as how they obtain new customer and collect debts.

In addition to resolving the question of an ATDS, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of Facebook’s petition has other implications. In the short term, companies and practitioners are likely to see stays across the robust and active TCPA docket as lower courts await direction on this core (often threshold) legal question from the Supreme Court. While the decision in ACA International returned the ATDS definition to the FCC for consideration, the Supreme Court’s grant also makes it less likely that the FCC will take any additional affirmative steps on the definition of an ATDS until the Facebook case is decided.

The Supreme Court’s next term opens on October 5, 2020, and oral argument will be scheduled for a date sometime thereafter. A decision can be expected to be published sometime between the argument and when the terms recesses in late June/July 2021.

Background

When first enacted in 1991, the TCPA prohibited calls placed using an automatic dialer or prerecorded voice with certain, specific exceptions. In 2015, Congress amended the TCPA to permit calls that relate to the collection of debts guaranteed by the U.S. government. That amendment does not permit the use of the same technology for debts guaranteed by private lenders or calls related to other topics, which served as the basis for challenges that the exception rendered the statute unconstitutionally content-based in violation of the First Amendment. In 2019, the Fourth Circuit agreed, finding the exception failed strict scrutiny, was unconstitutional, and should be severed from the TCPA. The government disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s decision and petitioned the Supreme Court to review the decision. Plaintiffs also filed a cross-petition.

Supreme Court Affirms

In the controlling opinion written by Justice Kavanaugh (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito), relying on Reed v. Town of Gilbert and applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court held that the government debt exception to the TCPA was an unconstitutional content based speaker restriction. As a remedy, the majority opted to sever the government debt exception from the TCPA, which leaves the remainder of the TCPA fully operative.

Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that both severability principles and the Communication Act’s severance clause mandated severance in this case. Justice Kavanaugh also reasoned that the remainder of the TCPA survived the constitutional challenge because Congress has a continuing interest in protecting consumer privacy, noting that “[t]he continuing robocall restriction proscribes tens of millions of would-be robocalls that would otherwise occur every day.”

In a short concurrence, Justice Sotomayor argued that the exception should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny; however, she agreed that the exception also did not survive that analysis and therefore should be severed.

In a partial dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan) argued that the Supreme Court should have applied intermediate scrutiny because the restriction did not suppress a particular viewpoint or threaten the neutrality of a public forum. Justice Breyer reasoned that the exception survived intermediate scrutiny because the speech related harm of the exception was modest in proportion to the important government goal of protecting the public fisc. Justice Breyer also found that the exception was narrowly tailored because it only applied to the limited categories of calls related to the collection of government debt. For Justice Breyer, strict scrutiny should only apply when a restriction interferes with the marketplace of ideas or interferes with an individual’s right to communicate with the government. With respect to the proper remedy, however, Justice Breyer agreed that severability of the offending exception was appropriate.

In another partial dissent, Justice Gorsuch (joined, in relevant part, by Justice Thomas) attacked the Court’s severability doctrine, including because the application of the doctrine in this instance did not provide the plaintiffs with the relief that they had initially sought. Instead of a remedy which allows for the plaintiffs to speak more freely, severance banned additional speech. For Justice Gorsuch, that result undercuts the purpose of the First Amendment, which is intended to act as a buffer against government restriction of speech, not assist it. Thus, he felt severance was an insufficient response.

Ultimately, 7 Justices agreed that severance of the government debt exception was the proper remedy, while only two (Justices Gorsuch and Thomas) concluded that the entire TCPA should be struck down as an improper content-based restriction.

Impact

Unless a caller was relying upon the government debt exception to avoid liability under the TCPA, this decision does very little to change the status quo on TCPA enforcement and compliance. The opinion did not wade into the contentious definition of an automatic telephone dialing system under the TCPA (which has become the subject of a widening Circuit split). Accordingly, callers should remain vigilant whenever telemarketing and consistently audit their telemarketing procedures to avoid potential liability.

In the first ruling, P2P Alliance, the Bureau ruled that an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) is not determined by whether the equipment has the capability to send a large volume of calls or texts in a short period of time. Instead, the Bureau, while recognizing that the Commission’s interpretation of the ATDS definition remains pending, ruled that “whether the calling platform or equipment is an autodialer turns on whether such equipment is capable of dialing random or sequential telephone numbers without human intervention.” The Bureau also provides an illuminating discussion of the so-called “human intervention” element of prior FCC statements regarding autodialers.

In the second ruling, Anthem, Inc., the Bureau denied a petition to exempt certain healthcare-related calls from the TCPA’s consent requirements. In this order, the Bureau breaks less new ground and instead reiterates that prior express consent must be obtained before a call (or text) is made and that the supposed value or “urgency” of the communication does not necessarily make it permissible.

Besides these two petitions, the Commission has nearly three dozen petitions pending before it on a variety of matters relating to exemptions from the TCPA’s consent requirements, the collection and revocation of consent, the “junk fax” provisions, and other questions raised by the flood of TCPA class action litigation in the last five years. If the FCC begins addressing these other pending petitions, the course of TCPA class action litigation could change significantly.

In March 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a landmark rebuke of the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA. The case, ACA International v. FCC, reviewed a 2015 Omnibus Declaratory Ruling on a variety of matters, the most notable of which was the FCC’s expansive interpretation of an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), the use of which triggers therobo TCPA’s prior express consent requirements and private right of action provisions. In ACA International, the court found the FCC’s interpretation “impermissibly broad” and remanded the case to the FCC for further consideration.

Since that time, the FCC has taken comment twice on the ACA International remand, but FCC Chairman Pai has focused the agency’s efforts on identifying and reducing illegal robocalls rather than addressing the remand. Chairman Pai has repeatedly said that unwanted automated calls is a top consumer complaint and he has pursued a multi-faceted approach to preventing or blocking those calls before they reach consumers.

The Commission has

• authorized voice service providers to block incoming calls that “reasonable call analytics” identify as likely illegal calls,
• mandated that service providers implement a call authentication framework to prevent unlawfully spoofed calls,
• directed specific service providers to block certain calls or have their own calls blocked by other providers,
• proposed multiple fines exceeding $100 million each for illegally spoofed calls, and
• authorized a comprehensive database to identify when telephone numbers have been reassigned from a subscriber who may have given consent to a new subscriber.

The Anthem and P2P Alliance Rulings

Against this backdrop, the flood of TCPA class action cases has powered a rising tide of petitions for declaratory rulings addressing specific aspects of the TCPA’s requirements, from when consent is needed, how it may be obtained, and how it may be revoked. At Kelley Drye, we have chronicled these developments in our monthly TCPA Tracker and its accompanying FCC Petitions Tracker of the nearly three dozen pending petitions. The total number of petitions has risen slightly over time, as new petitions have modestly outnumbered decisions issued by the Commission.

P2P Alliance Petition (Two-Way Texting With Manual Intervention). In May 2018, the P2P Alliance, a group that represents providers and users of “peer to peer” text messaging services, sought a declaratory ruling that peer to peer messaging services did not involve an ATDS and thus were not subject to the restrictions on ATDS calls/texts contained in the TCPA. The petition sought a ruling with respect to text messaging services that enable two-way text communication, requiring a person to manually send each message. Although the Bureau declined to rule with respect to any specific platform – citing a lack of sufficient evidence regarding the how the platforms operate – the Bureau issued a ruling with several important clarifications.

First, the Bureau ruled that the ability of a platform or equipment to send “large volumes of messages” is not probative of whether that platform or equipment constitutes an ATDS under the TCPA. The Bureau declared that “whether the calling platform or equipment is an autodialer turns on whether such equipment is capable of dialing random or sequential telephone numbers without human intervention.”

This conclusion effectively puts to rest ambiguous statements in some prior orders that TCPA plaintiffs had argued brought any high-volume calling platform within the scope of the TCPA. Furthermore, the Bureau’s conclusion appears most consistent with decisions by several U.S. Courts of Appeal that have ruled an autodialer must employ a random or sequential number generator to meet the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS. The Bureau noted, however, that the “details” of the interpretation of an ATDS were before the Commission in ACA International so, until the Commission addressed that issue, the Bureau was relying solely on “the statutory definition of autodialer.”

The Bureau’s ruling contains an illuminating discussion of the so-called “human intervention” element of prior FCC statements regarding autodialers. Per the Bureau’s ruling, “If a calling platform is not capable of dialing such numbers without a person actively and affirmatively manually dialing each one, that platform is not an autodialer.” The Bureau explained the “actively and affirmatively” dialing standard as requiring a person to manually dial each number and send each message one at a time. Use of such technologies is not an “evasion” of the TCPA, the Bureau commented, because the TCPA “does not and was not intended to stop every type of call.”

Thus, while the full contours of the ATDS definition are still to be defined by the Commission, the Bureau’s P2P Alliance ruling helps to clarify that an “active and affirmative” manual process for sending calls or messages removes a platform or piece of equipment from the ambit of the TCPA. This ruling could buttress many district court rulings that have found sufficient human intervention in the operation of many calling or texting platforms.

Anthem Petition (Prior Express Consent for Healthcare-Related Calls). The Anthem petition addressed by the Bureau was filed in June 2015, one month before the FCC released the Omnibus Declaratory Ruling addressed in ACA International. (Anthem has a more recent petition addressing post-Omnibus order issues that remains pending.) In the June 2015 petition, Anthem asked the Commission to create an exemption for informational healthcare-related calls/texts initiated by healthcare providers and sent to existing patients, arguing that such communications were beneficial to patients and could be protected by an opt-out process it believed the Commission was then considering for ATDS calls. The Commission received limited comment in September 2015 (while the ACA International appeal was being litigated) and has received virtually no filings discussing the petition since that time.

In the ruling, the Bureau denied virtually all of Anthem’s requests, emphasizing instead the TCPA’s requirements for prior express consent for ATDS calls. Specifically, the Bureau ruled that “makers of robocalls generally must obtain a consumer’s prior express consent before making calls to the consumer’s wireless telephone number.” (emphasis in original). It rejected Anthem’s request for an exemption permitting such calls, subject to opt-out, and repeated that the “mere existence of a caller-consumer relationship” does not constitute consent. Importantly, however, the Bureau affirmed prior statements that a consumer who has knowingly released their phone number for a particular purpose has given consent to receive calls at that number.

To the extent that the Anthem petition sought an exemption based on the “urgency” of healthcare-related communications, the Bureau declined to create such an exception, emphasizing, however, that the “emergency purposes” exception could apply to the extent the calls/texts satisfied the Commission’s rules and its recent COVID-19 Declaratory Ruling.

In the end, the ruling likely will not change the status quo for calls and texts being made today. The Bureau emphasized previous rulings requiring prior express consent and endorsed previous statements about how such consent may be obtained. Further, the Bureau affirmed the “emergency purposes” exception, although declining to expand its scope. Thus, entities making calls or texts following prior FCC guidance should not need to make any changes as a result of the Anthem ruling.

Looking Ahead

These decisions are not the broad rulings that many hoped for when ACA International was remanded to the FCC in March 2018. Chairman Pai was highly critical of the 2015 Omnibus order from the FCC (from which he dissented) and welcomed the ACA International decision. He has focused the agency on reducing unwanted calls prior to addressing the legal interpretations called for by the remand. Now, however, with those actions at an advanced stage and with his expected time as Chairman of the FCC about to end, many are wondering if the Pai Commission will revisit the ATDS definition, revocation of consent, and safe harbor questions remanded to it. Even if it does not, however, the Commission has nearly three dozen other petitions still pending, which could provide needed guidance on discrete issues that have arisen in TCPA litigation.

We don’t know at this time which way the FCC is likely to go, or even if it will address more TCPA issues during Chairman Pai’s tenure, but enterprises and service providers should watch the FCC closely over the next few months.

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TCPA litigation has largely focused on the autodialer restriction over the past decade. In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted an expansive interpretation of the restriction, which the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated and remanded in 2018. While the industry has waited for the FCC to offer further guidance, entities making calls and sending texts have navigated an environment plagued by uncertainty. Several courts of appeals have adopted conflicting interpretations of the autodialer provision. Meanwhile, the FCC could offer its interpretation at any time, throwing the issue into further litigation in all probability. In this environment, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the constitutionality of one TCPA exemption in the Barr case. Many are hoping for a decision that goes beyond the 2015 amendment and offers definitive guidance on the autodialer provision’s scope. This post discusses what to expect – and what to watch for – in the Supreme Court’s oral argument this week.

Background

In Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants v. Sessions, 323 F. Supp. 3d 737 (E.D.N.C. 2018), a group of political and polling organizations who wished to use autodialer technology to contact potential voters, sued the Government challenging the constitutionality of the TCPA’s autodialer ban. The group argued that the autodialer ban is a content-based restriction on speech, which does not survive strict scrutiny under First Amendment jurisprudence. According to the plaintiffs, the autodialer restriction fails strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement because it allows the FCC to promulgate various exemptions based on the content of the call and the 2015 amendment exempts calls related to the collection of government debt. Therefore, the law is not narrowly tailored to advance the privacy interests of the TCPA. Additionally, Plaintiffs asserted that less restrictive means could advance the TCPA’s interests.

The district court disagreed with the Plaintiffs and found that the government debt collection exemption survived strict scrutiny because it is a narrow exception, which furthers the compelling interest of government debt collection. Additionally, the court declined to consider the constitutionality of the FCC’s exemptions because it reasoned that it was not the correct court to hear such challenges. Regarding Congressional delegation of authority to the FCC to create exemptions, the court reasoned that the delegation “does not substantively except any communications” and therefore “is not facially or inherently content-based.” Lastly, the court concluded that the supposed less restrictive means would not be as effective in achieving the purposes of the TCPA.

Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit. In Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 923 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019), the Fourth Circuit held that the government debt exemption failed strict scrutiny due to under-inclusiveness. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the exemption is underinclusive because: (1) the exemption “subverts the privacy protections underlying the ban” by authorizing many intrusive calls, and (2) debt collection calls are “among the most intrusive, disruptive, and complained of phone calls.” However, instead of invalidating the entire TCPA, the court relied on a severance clause in the Communications Act of 1934 (which contains the TCPA) and severed the government debt collection exemption. The court reasoned that severance was appropriate because Congress explicitly intended the severance of constitutionally infirm portions of the Communications Act and the autodialer restriction had worked effectively for twenty-four years before Congress amended it to exempt government debt collection calls.

Consequently, on November 14, 2019, the Solicitor General petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision to settle the question of the TCPA’s constitutionality and to provide clarity on the severance of unconstitutional portions of the statute. On January 10, 2020, the Supreme Court accepted the petition for review.

Previewing the Supreme Court Review

The Supreme Court accepted two questions regarding the TCPA:

1. Is the 2015 government debt collection exemption constitutional, and
2. Is the appropriate remedy to sever the provision from the TCPA?

On the first question, the Government argued that the government debt collection exemption is not content-based but relationship-based as it is dependent on the relationship between debtors (called parties) and their creditor (the Government). Therefore, it argued, the government debt collection exemption is actually subject to intermediate scrutiny, which it passes since it is a narrow exception, which applies to a few calls only and furthers the significant interest of protecting the public fisc. This comports with the autodialer restriction, which is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. The American Association of Political Consultants (Respondents in the Supreme Court) asserted that the Fourth Circuit correctly found that the autodialer restriction as currently written is a content-based restriction, which fails strict scrutiny and renders the TCPA unconstitutional.

Remedy

As to the second question, Respondents argued that First Amendment jurisprudence mandates that courts should issue decisions that protect speech and not abridge it. Thus, Respondents argued, finding the TCPA to contain a content-based restriction on speech, the proper remedy should have been to strike down the restriction on speech, not to sever the “speech-promoting exception.” Respondents also argued that the autodialer restriction must be invalidated because the TCPA, even after the Fourth Circuit’s remedy, continues to be an unconstitutional restriction on speech. .

Amicus Curiae Positions

In addition to the arguments presented by the litigants, interested parties filed 17 amicus curiae briefs. On the one hand, supporting the government and the constitutionality of the exemption were many states, members of Congress, student loan servicing centers and several consumer interest groups. In the amicus brief submitted by the states, the states argued, among other things, that the robocall ban should be upheld because it prohibits highly intrusive robocalls regardless of content and therefore passes First Amendment scrutiny. In the amicus brief submitted by the members of Congress, they argued that the TCPA is a critical law that stops intrusions on Americans’ privacy, deters scams, and protects the integrity of the telephone as a means of communication. Consumer groups similarly argued that the TCPA protects government interests “of the highest order” (according to Public Citizen) and argued that invalidation would harm consumer privacy. The consumer interests generally argued that, even if the government debt collection provision fails to satisfy scrutiny, the remainder of the TCPA should survive.

Notably, while not supporting either party, consumer groups the National Consumer Law Center and Consumer Federation of America, joined by telecommunications carrier Verizon, argued that the government’s interest is compelling and argued in support of the TCPA’s restrictions on calling, particularly restrictions on unconsented calls to cellular phones.

On the other hand, supporting the position that the provision is unconstitutional were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, debt collection companies, several business groups and several free speech groups. In its amicus brief, the Chamber of Commerce argued that the TCPA should be invalidated because the autodialer restriction has become a tremendous source of meritless litigation that FCC guidance has not addressed. Similarly, trade groups such as the Retail Energy Supply Association argued that the government debt collection exemption is not severable because Congress would not have adopted such broad restrictions on automated calls without the exemptions adopted in the statute. Debt collectors such as Portfolio Recovery Associates sounded a similar point, arguing that the TCPA’s “open ended delegation of authority” to the FCC to create exemptions renders the statutory scheme unconstitutional. The Retail Litigation Center, while ostensibly not taking a position on either issue, offered an extensive critique of the TCPA’s “real world effects” on communications with customers and urged the Court to “address this dysfunction” in its disposition of the case.

What to Watch For in Oral Argument

With this lineup of arguments, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in a highly unusual setting. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court scheduled its first-ever arguments to be held via teleconference for this week, giving court-watchers an unprecedented opportunity to hear arguments live, rather than via audio files released after the argument. Due to the teleconferencing format, the Justices will ask questions in order of seniority, rather than the customary rapid-fire open questioning format. In earlier arguments this week, the approach permitted a more straightforward examination of the issues, with fewer interruptions in the litigant’s arguments.

The resolution of Barr could affect many stakeholders. A key question to watch will be the extent to which the Court entertains questions relating to severability of the government debt collection exemption and the broader TCPA critiques offered by various amicus parties. While the Supreme Court has ruled in several TCPA cases recently, thus far, it has addressed the issues narrowly or on grounds not exclusive to the TCPA. We will be watching to see if the Court may deviate from this approach in Barr and bring some clarity to the more contentious provisions of the TCPA.

In the meantime, litigation has continued to move forward in many cases. Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit addressed the ATDS definition, agreeing with decisions by the 2nd and 3rd Circuits on an interpretation that requires the use of a random or sequential number generator, and disagreeing with an interpretation of the 9th Circuit to the contrary. Our colleagues at a KDW sister blog, AdLaw Access, provide the analysis of this decision and its impact.

As we covered extensively in several previous blog posts, one of the primary consequences of the case were questions about the limits of the FTC’s jurisdiction. The case mirrored a time when the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) took opposing positions in successive administrations regarding whether mobile data services and other Broadband Internet Access Services (“BIAS”) were subject to FCC regulation. One of the central questions underlying the case was which agency, the FCC or the FTC, could regulate AT&T’s mobile data practices. After the FTC won a Ninth Circuit decision that its jurisdiction reaches to non-common carrier activities of common carriers (and the FCC concluded that mobile BIAS was not a common carrier service), AT&T agreed to settle the FTC case. However, so long as the jurisdiction of particular services remains in doubt, or is subject to changing FCC positions, service providers will face potential overlapping enforcement activities by the two agencies.

The path to determining the FTC’s jurisdiction was long. In response to the FTC’s 2014 complaint, AT&T moved to dismiss the case, arguing that, because it is a common carrier, the Company is exempt from FTC regulation under Section 5 of the FTC Act. AT&T argued that the exemption in Section 5 for common carriers was “status based” – that is, that the FTC could not regulate any activities of a common carrier, even activities the FCC had subjected to limited or no regulation. The FTC responded by asserting that Section 5 of the FTC Act exempts only the common carrier activities of common carriers from FTC regulation.

Agreeing with the FTC, the district court denied AT&T’s motion to dismiss on March 31, 2015. The Company then appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”). On August 29, 2016, a three-judge panel issued an opinion that reversed the district court’s decision and dismissed the case. The FTC then requested a rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Circuit granted on May 9, 2017. On February 26, 2018, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, issued an opinion reversing its previous decision and giving the FTC broad authority to regulate practices not classified by the FCC as telecommunications services. It then remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. AT&T settled the case before the District Court addressed the merits of the allegations.

Notably, AT&T commits to making refunds within 90 days to eligible customers without requiring a claims process. AT&T agreed to issue bill credits to current customers and to issue refunds to former customers. Any remainder not distributed will be deposited into a redress fund maintained by the FTC. Commissioner Rohit Chopra of the FTC issued a statement accompanying the settlement, in which he urged the FTC to pursue fraudulent practices by large and small firms alike, asserting that “scammers come in all sizes.”

Having settled with the FTC, AT&T is not necessarily out of hot water for alleged data throttling during this time period. In 2015, the FCC issued a $100 million Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL) to AT&T over its mobile broadband data services and practices. The FCC also reached a $48 million settlement with T-Mobile on October 20, 2016 concerning a similar data throttling allegation regarding mobile data services. However, since the FCC’s leadership changed hands in early 2017, the Commission has not taken any action to finalize (or settle) the AT&T NAL. It remains pending, four years after its issuance.

Generally speaking, and among other restrictions, the TCPA makes it unlawful to call or text a cell phone using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) or artificial or prerecorded voice without the prior express consent of the called party. As part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Congress created a content-specific exemption that allowed ATDS calls to be placed if they were to collect a government-backed debt (the “debt-collection exemption”). In other words, a debt collector calling to collect on certain government backed mortgages or student loans were exempt from the act, but the same debt collector would not be exempt if calling to collecting on a non-government backed loan.

Content-based laws must satisfy the strict scrutiny test of the First Amendment. This means that content-based exemptions, such as the debt-collection exemption, are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government can show that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in overturning the District Court’s decision, held that the debt-collection exemption does not meet that standard, and is therefore unconstitutional.

This decision was announced in the case of American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. (“AAPC”) et. al v. Federal Communication Commission (FCC). The Fourth Circuit agreed with the AAPC that the debt-collection exemption was content based, and consequently that strict scrutiny test was appropriate. As explained by the Court:

Under the debt-collection exemption, the relationship between the federal government and the debtor is only relevant to the subject matter of the call. In other words, the debt-collection exemption applies to a phone call made to the debtor because the call is about the debt, not because of any relationship between the federal government and the debtor… In these circumstances, the debt-collection exemption to the automated call ban constitutes a content-based speech restriction.

Although the Court held that the debt-collection exemption was unconstitutional, it did not invalidate the entire statute as the appellant and many defendants in pending lawsuits had hoped. Instead, it determined that the appropriate remedy was to sever the exemption, leaving the rest of the statute intact.

Despite the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the battle over the constitutionality of the TCPA continues. The Ninth Circuit is currently considering a similar constitutional challenge to the TCPA in Gallion v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., in which oral argument was held on March 11.

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in AAPC highlights the ongoing struggle over the scope and application of the TCPA. As we’ve blogged about before, the FCC is believed to be on the cusp of issuing a new order on the definition of ATDS under the Act, which definition has been a hotbed of litigation and regulatory challenges. We will continue to monitor developments and post updates on this site.

Highlights from the 10th Annual Update will include:

• Unpacking the first significant revisions to the Form 499-A Instructions in several years.
• What’s next for the E-rate program after the amortization waiver and Category 2 budget recommendations.
• The impact of NaLA v. FCC on proposals to modify the Lifeline program.
• The transition to High Cost Phase II support and increases in the Rural Healthcare budget.
• Prospects for contributions reform in 2019.

The current and future definition of what qualifies as an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS" or "autodialer") remains a hotly debated and evaluated issue for every company placing calls and texts, or designing dialer technology, as well as the litigants and jurists already mired in litigation under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"). Last year, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s ATDS definition in ACA International v. FCC, Case No. 15-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Courts since have diverged in approaches on interpreting the ATDS term. See, e.g., prior discussions of Marks and Dominguez. All eyes thus remain fixed on the FCC for clarification.

In this post, we revisit the relevant details of the Court’s decision in ACA International, and prior statements of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai concerning the ATDS definition to assess how history may be a guide to how the FCC approaches this issue.

DC Circuit Found FCC’s 2015 Definition of ATDS Was Too Broad

Under the statute, an ATDS is defined as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator” and “to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A)-(B). The D.C. Circuit unambiguously concluded that in 2015 the FCC adopted an overly expansive and unreasonable view of this definition. In its 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order, the FCC defined equipment as an autodialer if it contained the potential “capacity” to dial random or sequential numbers, even if that capacity could be added only through specific modifications or software updates (so long as the modifications were not too theoretical or too attenuated). Under this revised interpretation, any equipment that could be modified to dial numbers randomly or sequentially would be an ATDS – and therefore subjected the caller to potential liability under the statute. The FCC also made contradictory statements about the capabilities that an autodialer must possess – reaffirming and then appearing to disclaim its prior rulings on predictive dialers, and offering contradictory statements regarding the level of human intervention that would preclude a call from being auto-dialed. These statements further compounded the uncertainty surrounding autodialers.

The D.C. Circuit Court was troubled by the “eye-popping” reach of the 2015 Order’s interpretation, which could be applied to any smartphone, and found that such a reach could not be squared with Congress’ findings in enacting the TCPA. The Court observed that the FCC’s interpretation was “utterly unreasonable in the breadth of its regulatory [in]clusion.” It rejected the FCC’s justification that a broad reach was necessary to encompass “modern dialing equipment,” concluding that Congress need not be presumed to have intended the term ATDS to apply “in perpetuity” and citing paging services as an example of TCPA provisions that have ceased to have practical significance.

Although the Court did not clarify the requisite “capacity” needed—present or future—to be an ATDS, it declared that “the TCPA cannot reasonably be read to render every smartphone an ATDS subject to the Act’s restrictions.” The Court also found that the confusion over the term “capacity” as it relates to the ATDS definition was multiplied by the FCC’s insufficient explanation of the requisite features that the covered ATDS equipment must possess. Specifically, the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order fell short of reasoned decision making in “offer[ing] no meaningful guidance” as to the seminal questions of whether a device (1) must itself have the ability to generate random or sequential numbers to be dialed, (2) must dial numbers without human intervention or (3) must “dial thousands of numbers in a short period of time.”

By setting aside the prior interpretation, the D.C. Circuit handed the issue back to the FCC for further analysis and explanation. The FCC sought comment on how to respond to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling and appears to be close to issuing a decision on the remanded issues.

Is Commissioner Pai’s 2015 Dissent a Harbinger of the Decision on Remand?

When the FCC’s 2015 omnibus TCPA Declaratory Ruling and Order was issued, then-Commissioner Pai (now Chairman of the FCC) authored a highly critical dissent, including a direct challenge to the interpretation of an autodialer. In his view, the ruling improperly expanded the definition of an ATDS beyond the legislative mandate, and needed to be reigned back in.

Chairman Pai’s dissent took issue with the ATDS definition as overbroad and over-inclusive. He posited that only equipment that has the capability to dial sequential numbers or random numbers should qualify as an ATDS. “If a piece of equipment cannot do those two things—if it cannot store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator and if it cannot dial such numbers—” Chairman Pai asked, “then how can it possibly meet the statutory definition? It cannot.” The principal issue addressed in the 2015 order was whether the statute’s reference to the “capacity” of ATDS equipment referred to the potential capabilities of the equipment. On this front, Chairman Pai’s view was clear: he believed that the statutory definition of an ATDS was limited to the equipment’s “present capacity,” not to its potential or theoretical capacity, and his dissent focused largely on why the concept of potential capacity was a bridge too far.

Chairman Pai’s interpretation of the statute closely hues to the specific capabilities listed in the text of the TCPA—the ability to store or produce numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. The FCC’s interpretation, Chairman Pai charged, “transforms the TCPA from a statutory rifle‐shot targeting specific companies that market their services through automated random or sequential dialing into an unpredictable shotgun blast covering virtually all communications devices.” Chairman Pai was willing to claim victory for the “rifle‐shot” set, stating that if today’s callers have abandoned random or sequential dialers due to the TCPA’s prohibition, then the TCPA has “accomplished the precise goal Congress set out for it” and, if parties want to address more modern types of abusive dialing equipment, they should go to Congress for action.

Given Chairman Pai’s previous statements and the D.C. Circuit’s criticism of the prior order’s scope, it appears likely that the FCC will look only to the present capabilities of particular equipment, rather than its potential or future capacity. However, this alone does not answer the question before the agency. In 2015, Chairman Pai seemed ready to declare the autodialer definition to have achieved its goal, but now that he leads the agency, will he hold to that position?

Notably, since assuming the leadership of the Commission, Chairman Pai has made multiple statements about the need to address the “scourge” of robocalling. The FCC has taken several actions aimed at reducing abusive calls, better detecting spoofing and unlawful activity, and empowering carriers to block illegal calls and consumers to block illegal and unwanted calls. Much of these actions were detailed in an FCC Bureau report on illegal robocalls released on February 14. While it eschews any recommendations for future actions, the report details ongoing FCC and industry efforts to combat illegal robocalls, and identifies some of the challenges to FCC enforcement activities. The Commission also recently adopted a database for number assignment changes that aims to reduce misdirected calls to the wrong telephone number. Will these robocall reduction efforts give the Pai-led FCC the “cover” to narrow the definition of an ATDS, and, if so, by how much will it be narrowed?

Some narrowing of the prior definition is inevitable. Few argue that ordinary smartphones should be subject to the TCPA restrictions. But even advocates of a broad interpretation disagree on how to get there: some have argued that the FCC should maintain the prior definition but exempt smartphones, while others argued for standards that would exclude “ordinary” or unmodified smartphones. Some in the industry, on the other hand, are asking the FCC to focus more narrowly on equipment prominent in the early 1990s, when the TCPA was passed, and be less likely to include equipment that solely calls from pre-loaded lists of numbers. This would be consistent with Chairman Pai’s dissent – provided he has the other votes to achieve it. An interpretation along this line would appear to be good news for predictive dialing equipment and various dialers that involve differing levels of human intervention to complete calls.

Given the divergent interpretations in Marks and Dominguez, the FCC’s interpretation of the ATDS definition is almost certainly headed back to the courts for confirmation that the FCC’s revised definition (whatever it is) lies within the agency’s delegated powers and is sufficiently clear to pass judicial muster. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of the legislative mandate for what can be regulated would leave to Congress the question of whether a broader definition must be considered, including how to address modern dialing equipment and other modern technologies. Several anti-robocall bills aimed at expanding the reach of the ATDS definition are already under consideration in both houses of Congress. Thus, even if the FCC adopts a narrower interpretation, we’re likely to see the ATDS issue shift to other forums in the second half of 2019.

With that in mind, and given the continual cycle of TCPA lawsuits, companies placing calls or texts and those designing calling or texting platforms should consider how participating in the FCC and subsequent proceedings can further their interests. They also would benefit from determining how the clarified ATDS definition is likely to affect their business, and whether any proactive adjustments would be helpful to prevent disruption to the business or to manage TCPA risk exposure, including evaluating whether the consent they obtain is sufficient. Kelley Drye will continue to follow these issues and provide updates through its monthly TCPA Tracker. Please contact us to join our list or if you have any questions concerning these issues.

Under the FCC’s proposal, the Fraud Division would be comprised of existing Enforcement Bureau staff reassigned from other divisions who currently work on USF-related investigations. Once established, the Fraud Division is expected to collaborate with the FCC’s Office of the Inspector General, the Department of Justice, and other federal and state agencies to prosecute fraud involving USF programs. But beyond its proposed basic composition and collaborations, the FCC offered few details regarding how the new Fraud Division fits into its existing enforcement structure. For example, the Order provides no information regarding the anticipated size or leadership of the Fraud Division. The Order also does not explain whether the proposed Fraud Division would operate as a replacement for or some other evolution of the Enforcement Bureau’s existing USF Strike Force established in 2014, which the FCC similarly charged with combating waste, fraud, and abuse in USF programs. In addition, the Order does not indicate what role, if any, the new Fraud Division would have in prosecuting violations involving other FCC-supported programs, such as the Telecommunications Relay Services. Finally, unlike the other Enforcement Bureau divisions, which generally are organized around a broad subject matter (e.g., spectrum, media), the new division would be organized around a particular violation: USF fraud. Thus, it remains to be seen how the new Fraud Division would operate in concert with its concomitant divisions during investigations and enforcement actions.

As the FCC’s Fraud Division proposal involves internal Enforcement Bureau reorganization and does not alter existing regulations, it is not subject to notice and comment rulemaking. In accordance with federal law, however, the Fraud Division will not be established until the FCC’s reorganization plan receives approval from the White House Office of Management and Budget as well as both the House and Senate Appropriation Committees. The FCC did not provide a timeframe in which such approval is expected.

This case came about because of an effort by Charter to move Spectrum Voice, its VoIP offering in Minnesota, to a separate corporate entity, Charter Advanced. The MPUC decided to regulate Charter Advanced’s VoIP service as a telecommunications service due to its interconnection with the PSTN. Charter filed suit in response and asserted that its VoIP service is an information service and thus, state regulation is preempted under the Act. The district court decided in Charter’s favor ruling that the VoIP service was an information service and MPUC regulation was preempted.

Here, the Circuit Court affirmed the lower court decision by emphasizing the way in which Charter’s service must transform analog signals into IP information to facilitate a call between a VoIP service and a traditional telephone service. The appellate court found a transformation occurs wherein information (i.e., a phone call) enters Charter’s network in one format and leaves in another via a protocol conversion and such transformation is the “touchstone of the information services inquiry.” The Eighth Circuit’s analysis also briefly assessed the exclusions to Act’s information service definition and found they were not applicable to the characteristics of Charter’s VoIP service. The court specifically noted:

• The first exception is not applicable because Spectrum Voice is a service that is “between or among users” and the network protocol technology that allows users to call traditional telephony users is critical to the service.
• Regarding the second exclusion, the service is not aimed at providing backwards compatibility for existing customer premises equipment (“CPE”) but rather provides users with a new type of equipment to use the VoIP service.
• Finally, the service does not fit the internetworking exclusion because the conversion of information happens outside the carrier’s network, at the point of the CPE.

The Charter v. Lange decision makes a definitive determination, an action the FCC has repeatedly forgone, by concluding that VoIP service like Charter’s is in fact an information service as defined by the federal statue. Notably, Commissioner Michael O’Rielly has recently pushed for the FCC to end its own, self-induced uncertainty and declare VoIP to be an information service. (Former Commissioner Clyburn had a similar plea in 2015 statements). The FCC, while submitting an Amicus Brief supporting Charter in the case, did not go that far – at least not yet.

The issue of appropriate regulatory treatment of VoIP services continues to be a point of disagreement and confusion for telecommunications regulators as well as those possibly subject to this form of regulation in many states. While this case will only have precedential value over a segment of state regulators, it represents an unmistakably clear analysis of the issue that could be referenced in future cases considering regulatory treatment of VoIP. FCC Chairman Pai’s supportive statement in response to the decision bolsters the validity of the decision (and perhaps presages a change in the policy at the FCC) by noting that: “[F]ederal law for decades has recognized that states may not regulate information services. The Eighth Circuit’s decision is important for reaffirming that well-established principle: ‘[A]ny state regulation of an information service conflicts with the federal policy of nonregulation’ and is therefore preempted.” The Chairman has also referenced the decision more recently in supporting a DoJ lawsuit against California’s net neutrality law, calling Internet policy strictly the domain of the federal government.

The MPUC has petitioned the Eighth Circuit for en banc review of the decision in Charter v. Lange. The MPUC argues that Charter’s VoIP service should be treated in the same way as traditional wireline telephone service and be subject to state regulation because otherwise “it invites carriers to artificially alter technical aspects of their service to evade regulation and it undermines competitive neutrality.” Stay tuned for further developments in this matter.

The Public Notice generally focuses on the three main aspects of the D.C. Circuit decision (much of which was also the subject of a recent petition by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform and 17 co-petitioners), but seeks comment on other questions as well. Specifically, the FCC is requesting feedback on the following issues:

• Automatic Telephone Dialing Systems (ATDS). The FCC poses several questions to help assess what constitutes an ATDS. The Commission also asks how it should interpret the term “capacity,” as well as whether the TCPA should apply to a call if a caller is not using ATDS capability to place that particular call.
• Reassigned Numbers. The FCC seeks comment on how to interpret the term “called party” for calls to reassigned numbers. It further asks whether a reassigned numbers safe harbor is necessary, and how the Commission’s current proceeding to establish a reassigned numbers database should impact its interpretation, if at all.
• Revocation of Consent. The FCC seeks comment on how a called party may revoke prior express consent to receive robocalls, and specifically, what opt-out methods should be permissible in light of the D.C. Circuit’s decision calling for “reasonable” revocation of consent.
• Government Contractors and Government Debt Collection. The Public Notice acknowledges pending requests by the National Consumer Law Center, the Professional Services Council, and Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. for the FCC to reconsider previously adopted TCPA rules related to government contractors and government debt collection. In particular, the Public Notice asks whether contractors acting on behalf of federal, state, and local governments are “persons” under the TCPA, and if not, whether the rules adopted in the 2016 Federal Debt Collection Rules order even apply to a federal contractor collecting a federal debt.

In prior briefing and during oral argument, Petitioners and Intervenors challenged the Order’s considerable expansion of the scope of the TCPA. Petitioners and Intervenors focused on three main issues from the 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order: (1) the expanded definition of what types of equipment serve as an autodialer, leading to liability under the TCPA for using such technology to place calls, (2) the called party/reassigned number provision, which mandates the imposition of strict liability for any call beyond the first call to a reassigned number, and (3) whether the FCC must give clearer guidance relating to how consumers can revoke consent to receive calls or text messages.

To read our full advisory, please click here. We are reviewing the decision in detail and will have a more comprehensive summary available soon. In addition, Kelley Drye will be hosting a free webinar to discuss the implications of the decision and the future of TCPA reform efforts at the FCC and in Congress. More details will follow in the next few days.