The TCPA prohibits telemarketing calls to be placed using an ATDS without the requisite level of prior consent. Thus, the definition of what technology qualifies as an ATDS is often a fundamental, threshold question upon which TCPA litigation turns. Prior to 2015, the FCC had offered various, sometimes vague, interpretations of the term. In 2015, the FCC offered an expansive definition, which was set aside in March 2018 in the ACA International decision. While the issue has been before the FCC on remand for over two years now, courts nevertheless engaged in their own analysis of the statute, resulting in a broadening Circuit split on how the law is interpreted and applied and divergent outcomes based on the court in which the case is filed. Now the Supreme Court is poised (potentially) to resolve that dispute.

DEFINITION OF AN ATDS

Since the March 2018 decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in ACA International set aside the FCC’s overbroad and expansive definition of an ATDS, two distinct interpretations of an ATDS have emerged. In Marks v. Crunch San Diego, the Ninth Circuit held that any equipment that dials telephone numbers from a stored list qualifies as an ATDS under the TCPA. That expansive approach threatens to encompass ordinary smartphones on the market within the TCPA’s ambit. This approach is also employed by the Second Circuit. In contrast, the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have opted for a narrower, more textually honest and logical interpretation, that requires a showing that equipment has the present capacity to generate numbers using randomly or sequentially and dial them. (Arguably, the D.C. Circuit’s decision also called for an interpretation closer to the Third, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit interpretations). District Courts in the remaining Circuits (as well as some where the Circuit Courts have spoken) have generally (but inconsistently) adhered to one of these two approaches. Some of our prior discussions of these issues can be found here and here.

FACEBOOK SEEKS AN END TO TCPA CONFUSION

In Facebook, Inc. v. Noah Duguid, et al, Case No. 19-511 (2020), plaintiff Noah Duguid alleges that defendant Facebook had contacted him via text messages without appropriate levels of consent using an ATDS, as that term is defined under the TCPA. Mr. Duguid is not a Facebook customer and alleges that he received repeated login notification text messages from Facebook. Plaintiff alleges that he never provided the company with his cellphone number, much less prior express written consent to be contacted by text. Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed in the Northern District of California in March 2015 and dismissed without prejudice for failure to properly allege that an ATDS was used to send the texts at issue. In his Amended Complaint, Duguid added factual allegations that Facebook used an ATDS by maintaining a database of numbers on its computer and transmitting text message alerts to selected numbers from its database using an automated protocol.

Facebook again moved to dismiss Duguid’s allegations arguing that the TCPA was unconstitutional and that Duguid failed to plead the use of an ATDS. On February 16, 2017, the District Court granted Facebook’s motion to dismiss, finding the ATDS allegations were insufficient. Because of that finding, the court never reached the constitutional question. The court reasoned that Duguid’s ATDS allegations “strongly suggested direct targeting rather than random or sequential dialing,” which did not indicate the use of an ATDS. Importantly, the District Court rendered its opinion before the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the ATDS definition in Marks v. Crunch San Diego in September 2018.

On June 13, 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal. Applying the Marks standard, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Duguid had sufficiently alleged that Facebook used an ATDS by alleging the equipment “had the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.” The Ninth Circuit separately addressed Facebook’s constitutional challenge to the TCPA and agreed that, although the TCPA included content- and speaker-based restrictions on speech, the overall statute could be salvaged by severing what it saw as the most offensive aspect—the government debt exception.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

Facebook appealed and in its petition to the Supreme Court presented both the constitutional challenge and definitional question for review.

On July 6, 2020, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the TCPA in William P. Barr et al. v. American Association of Political Consultants et al., Case No. 19-631 (2020), thus mooting the constitutional challenge in Facebook’s petition. Our analysis of that decision can be found here.

On July 9, 2020, three days after it released its decision in Barr, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question: Whether the definition of ATDS in the TCPA encompasses any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “us[e] a random or sequential generator”?

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s resolution of this circuit split has the potential to forever change business communications by making it more or less difficult for businesses to reach their customers. As noted, a threshold question in TCPA litigation is whether equipment used to originate a call or text is an ATDS. The D.C. Circuit, in remanding the FCC’s 2015 expansive definition, noted that definition’s “eye-popping sweep.” Just how far the 29-year-old TCPA’s definition should reach into modern dialing technology has been a central question in litigation since the D.C. Circuit remand. How the Supreme Court addresses this could affect the methods businesses use to provide notifications and reminders to customers as well as how they obtain new customer and collect debts.

In addition to resolving the question of an ATDS, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of Facebook’s petition has other implications. In the short term, companies and practitioners are likely to see stays across the robust and active TCPA docket as lower courts await direction on this core (often threshold) legal question from the Supreme Court. While the decision in ACA International returned the ATDS definition to the FCC for consideration, the Supreme Court’s grant also makes it less likely that the FCC will take any additional affirmative steps on the definition of an ATDS until the Facebook case is decided.

The Supreme Court’s next term opens on October 5, 2020, and oral argument will be scheduled for a date sometime thereafter. A decision can be expected to be published sometime between the argument and when the terms recesses in late June/July 2021.

Background

When first enacted in 1991, the TCPA prohibited calls placed using an automatic dialer or prerecorded voice with certain, specific exceptions. In 2015, Congress amended the TCPA to permit calls that relate to the collection of debts guaranteed by the U.S. government. That amendment does not permit the use of the same technology for debts guaranteed by private lenders or calls related to other topics, which served as the basis for challenges that the exception rendered the statute unconstitutionally content-based in violation of the First Amendment. In 2019, the Fourth Circuit agreed, finding the exception failed strict scrutiny, was unconstitutional, and should be severed from the TCPA. The government disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s decision and petitioned the Supreme Court to review the decision. Plaintiffs also filed a cross-petition.

Supreme Court Affirms

In the controlling opinion written by Justice Kavanaugh (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito), relying on Reed v. Town of Gilbert and applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court held that the government debt exception to the TCPA was an unconstitutional content based speaker restriction. As a remedy, the majority opted to sever the government debt exception from the TCPA, which leaves the remainder of the TCPA fully operative.

Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that both severability principles and the Communication Act’s severance clause mandated severance in this case. Justice Kavanaugh also reasoned that the remainder of the TCPA survived the constitutional challenge because Congress has a continuing interest in protecting consumer privacy, noting that “[t]he continuing robocall restriction proscribes tens of millions of would-be robocalls that would otherwise occur every day.”

In a short concurrence, Justice Sotomayor argued that the exception should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny; however, she agreed that the exception also did not survive that analysis and therefore should be severed.

In a partial dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan) argued that the Supreme Court should have applied intermediate scrutiny because the restriction did not suppress a particular viewpoint or threaten the neutrality of a public forum. Justice Breyer reasoned that the exception survived intermediate scrutiny because the speech related harm of the exception was modest in proportion to the important government goal of protecting the public fisc. Justice Breyer also found that the exception was narrowly tailored because it only applied to the limited categories of calls related to the collection of government debt. For Justice Breyer, strict scrutiny should only apply when a restriction interferes with the marketplace of ideas or interferes with an individual’s right to communicate with the government. With respect to the proper remedy, however, Justice Breyer agreed that severability of the offending exception was appropriate.

In another partial dissent, Justice Gorsuch (joined, in relevant part, by Justice Thomas) attacked the Court’s severability doctrine, including because the application of the doctrine in this instance did not provide the plaintiffs with the relief that they had initially sought. Instead of a remedy which allows for the plaintiffs to speak more freely, severance banned additional speech. For Justice Gorsuch, that result undercuts the purpose of the First Amendment, which is intended to act as a buffer against government restriction of speech, not assist it. Thus, he felt severance was an insufficient response.

Ultimately, 7 Justices agreed that severance of the government debt exception was the proper remedy, while only two (Justices Gorsuch and Thomas) concluded that the entire TCPA should be struck down as an improper content-based restriction.

Impact

Unless a caller was relying upon the government debt exception to avoid liability under the TCPA, this decision does very little to change the status quo on TCPA enforcement and compliance. The opinion did not wade into the contentious definition of an automatic telephone dialing system under the TCPA (which has become the subject of a widening Circuit split). Accordingly, callers should remain vigilant whenever telemarketing and consistently audit their telemarketing procedures to avoid potential liability.

TCPA litigation has largely focused on the autodialer restriction over the past decade. In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted an expansive interpretation of the restriction, which the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated and remanded in 2018. While the industry has waited for the FCC to offer further guidance, entities making calls and sending texts have navigated an environment plagued by uncertainty. Several courts of appeals have adopted conflicting interpretations of the autodialer provision. Meanwhile, the FCC could offer its interpretation at any time, throwing the issue into further litigation in all probability. In this environment, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the constitutionality of one TCPA exemption in the Barr case. Many are hoping for a decision that goes beyond the 2015 amendment and offers definitive guidance on the autodialer provision’s scope. This post discusses what to expect – and what to watch for – in the Supreme Court’s oral argument this week.

Background

In Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants v. Sessions, 323 F. Supp. 3d 737 (E.D.N.C. 2018), a group of political and polling organizations who wished to use autodialer technology to contact potential voters, sued the Government challenging the constitutionality of the TCPA’s autodialer ban. The group argued that the autodialer ban is a content-based restriction on speech, which does not survive strict scrutiny under First Amendment jurisprudence. According to the plaintiffs, the autodialer restriction fails strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement because it allows the FCC to promulgate various exemptions based on the content of the call and the 2015 amendment exempts calls related to the collection of government debt. Therefore, the law is not narrowly tailored to advance the privacy interests of the TCPA. Additionally, Plaintiffs asserted that less restrictive means could advance the TCPA’s interests.

The district court disagreed with the Plaintiffs and found that the government debt collection exemption survived strict scrutiny because it is a narrow exception, which furthers the compelling interest of government debt collection. Additionally, the court declined to consider the constitutionality of the FCC’s exemptions because it reasoned that it was not the correct court to hear such challenges. Regarding Congressional delegation of authority to the FCC to create exemptions, the court reasoned that the delegation “does not substantively except any communications” and therefore “is not facially or inherently content-based.” Lastly, the court concluded that the supposed less restrictive means would not be as effective in achieving the purposes of the TCPA.

Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit. In Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 923 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019), the Fourth Circuit held that the government debt exemption failed strict scrutiny due to under-inclusiveness. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the exemption is underinclusive because: (1) the exemption “subverts the privacy protections underlying the ban” by authorizing many intrusive calls, and (2) debt collection calls are “among the most intrusive, disruptive, and complained of phone calls.” However, instead of invalidating the entire TCPA, the court relied on a severance clause in the Communications Act of 1934 (which contains the TCPA) and severed the government debt collection exemption. The court reasoned that severance was appropriate because Congress explicitly intended the severance of constitutionally infirm portions of the Communications Act and the autodialer restriction had worked effectively for twenty-four years before Congress amended it to exempt government debt collection calls.

Consequently, on November 14, 2019, the Solicitor General petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision to settle the question of the TCPA’s constitutionality and to provide clarity on the severance of unconstitutional portions of the statute. On January 10, 2020, the Supreme Court accepted the petition for review.

Previewing the Supreme Court Review

The Supreme Court accepted two questions regarding the TCPA:

1. Is the 2015 government debt collection exemption constitutional, and
2. Is the appropriate remedy to sever the provision from the TCPA?

On the first question, the Government argued that the government debt collection exemption is not content-based but relationship-based as it is dependent on the relationship between debtors (called parties) and their creditor (the Government). Therefore, it argued, the government debt collection exemption is actually subject to intermediate scrutiny, which it passes since it is a narrow exception, which applies to a few calls only and furthers the significant interest of protecting the public fisc. This comports with the autodialer restriction, which is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. The American Association of Political Consultants (Respondents in the Supreme Court) asserted that the Fourth Circuit correctly found that the autodialer restriction as currently written is a content-based restriction, which fails strict scrutiny and renders the TCPA unconstitutional.

Remedy

As to the second question, Respondents argued that First Amendment jurisprudence mandates that courts should issue decisions that protect speech and not abridge it. Thus, Respondents argued, finding the TCPA to contain a content-based restriction on speech, the proper remedy should have been to strike down the restriction on speech, not to sever the “speech-promoting exception.” Respondents also argued that the autodialer restriction must be invalidated because the TCPA, even after the Fourth Circuit’s remedy, continues to be an unconstitutional restriction on speech. .

Amicus Curiae Positions

In addition to the arguments presented by the litigants, interested parties filed 17 amicus curiae briefs. On the one hand, supporting the government and the constitutionality of the exemption were many states, members of Congress, student loan servicing centers and several consumer interest groups. In the amicus brief submitted by the states, the states argued, among other things, that the robocall ban should be upheld because it prohibits highly intrusive robocalls regardless of content and therefore passes First Amendment scrutiny. In the amicus brief submitted by the members of Congress, they argued that the TCPA is a critical law that stops intrusions on Americans’ privacy, deters scams, and protects the integrity of the telephone as a means of communication. Consumer groups similarly argued that the TCPA protects government interests “of the highest order” (according to Public Citizen) and argued that invalidation would harm consumer privacy. The consumer interests generally argued that, even if the government debt collection provision fails to satisfy scrutiny, the remainder of the TCPA should survive.

Notably, while not supporting either party, consumer groups the National Consumer Law Center and Consumer Federation of America, joined by telecommunications carrier Verizon, argued that the government’s interest is compelling and argued in support of the TCPA’s restrictions on calling, particularly restrictions on unconsented calls to cellular phones.

On the other hand, supporting the position that the provision is unconstitutional were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, debt collection companies, several business groups and several free speech groups. In its amicus brief, the Chamber of Commerce argued that the TCPA should be invalidated because the autodialer restriction has become a tremendous source of meritless litigation that FCC guidance has not addressed. Similarly, trade groups such as the Retail Energy Supply Association argued that the government debt collection exemption is not severable because Congress would not have adopted such broad restrictions on automated calls without the exemptions adopted in the statute. Debt collectors such as Portfolio Recovery Associates sounded a similar point, arguing that the TCPA’s “open ended delegation of authority” to the FCC to create exemptions renders the statutory scheme unconstitutional. The Retail Litigation Center, while ostensibly not taking a position on either issue, offered an extensive critique of the TCPA’s “real world effects” on communications with customers and urged the Court to “address this dysfunction” in its disposition of the case.

What to Watch For in Oral Argument

With this lineup of arguments, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in a highly unusual setting. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court scheduled its first-ever arguments to be held via teleconference for this week, giving court-watchers an unprecedented opportunity to hear arguments live, rather than via audio files released after the argument. Due to the teleconferencing format, the Justices will ask questions in order of seniority, rather than the customary rapid-fire open questioning format. In earlier arguments this week, the approach permitted a more straightforward examination of the issues, with fewer interruptions in the litigant’s arguments.

The resolution of Barr could affect many stakeholders. A key question to watch will be the extent to which the Court entertains questions relating to severability of the government debt collection exemption and the broader TCPA critiques offered by various amicus parties. While the Supreme Court has ruled in several TCPA cases recently, thus far, it has addressed the issues narrowly or on grounds not exclusive to the TCPA. We will be watching to see if the Court may deviate from this approach in Barr and bring some clarity to the more contentious provisions of the TCPA.